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Summary  findings
Milanovic  assesses  the performance  of Latvia's  system  of  households  (only  1.5 percent  of all households  receive  it)
social transfers, in three ways:  but among those that do receive it, it represents a
First, he analyzes the incidence (who receives transfers)  relatively high share (20 percent) of income. Households
of pensions, family allowances, unemployment benefits,  that are systematically "discriminated against" in the
and social assistance. Per capita analysis shows pensions  allocation of social assistance are urban households living
tending to be pro-rich and families allowances pro-poor  outside the capital (Riga) and those headed by male
(a finding typical in poverty analyses). Introducing an  adults.
equivalence scalc alters the results and shows all  Third, he looks at the regional allocation of social
individual cash transfers performing about the same:  assistance. The results confirm earlier findings of large
mildly pro-poor.  horizontal inequalities - that people with the same
Next, he examines the performance of social  income from different parts of the country are treated
assistance, which is, by definition, directed to the poor.  unequally, because the existing system is based on local
He shows that Latvia's current system is concentrated - financing of social assistance.
meaning that social assistance is disbursed to few
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This paper  analyzes the performance  of Latvia's  systemn  of social transfers,  using
the  1997-98  Household  budget  surveys  data  (Annex  gives  more  information  on  the
survey). Section 1 describes the incidence of various social transfers  (how much are they
focused on the poor?).  Section 2 presents an empirical study of Latvia's  social assistance
(who receives  social assistance  and how much?)  Section 3 compares Latvia's  results  in
poverty  alleviation  to  those  of  five other transition  countries.  Section  4  attempts  to
explain what  factors account  for the fact that  some poor  households  are systematically
excluded  from  social assistance.  Section  5 looks at regional  inequalities  in delivery  of
social assistance: a problem which has plagued Latvia authorities since Independence and
which is exacerbated by the fact that the full authority for social assistance is vested into
municipalities.
1.  INCIDENCE OF SOCIAL TRANSFERS
Household butlget surveys include six types of social transfers: old-age pensions,
other pensions,  family  allowances,  social assistance,  unemployment  benefits,  and other
social  tranisfers (scholarships,  sickness  benefits,  funeral  grant).  Total  social  transfers
account for aboult 28 percent  of gross income with the two types  of pensions accounting
for 24.5  percent of gross income.  Non-pension social transfers are small: family benefits
represent  2.3  percent  of  gross  income,2 unemployment  benefits  l/ 2 percent  of  gross
income, and social assistance only 0.3 percent  of gross income.  The incidence  of social
transfers  therefore  strongly  depends  on  what  is the  incidence  of pensions.  However,
since  pensions  are  a  "special"  social transfer  in the  sense  that  they  have  an  income-
smoothing function and may be regarded as deferred wages, our interest in how the social
transfers  system  performs  will  be  focused  mainly  on  the  smaller  transfers  like
unemployment benefits and social assistance whose prinmary  function, in principle, should
be to help the poor households.  3
Table  4.1a  shows  the  distribution  of  social  transfers  across  deciles  of  income
distribution.  All social transfers combined are, in absolate  terms, pro-rich: their amounts
tend to  increase  as  level  of income  goes up.  For example,  the bottom  ten percent  of
population receive only 31/2 percent of all transfers; the lop two deciles receive each more
than 11 percent of all transfers.  However, the pro-rich bias is due to the role of pensions.
If we deduct pensions, the bottom decile receives  13 pe:rcent of transfers,  and the top two
deciles  about 10 percent  each.  The distribution  of non-pension  transfers  is slightly pro-
poor  (in  absolute  terms),  as  the  poorer  households  (according  to  income  per  capita)
receive  slightly more than the rich.  But that result in turn is driven by family  benefits.
2 Family benefits inclide  maternity, family allowance, child care allowance, and birth grant.
3 This holds by definition for a non-contributory transfers like social assistance. It is slightly different for
unemployment benefits which are paid in respect of people who have, at least norninally, contributed (its function is
thus an insurance one).
2Since family  benefits  are not income-tested  4  and  since children  are disproportionately
represented  among  the poor,  5  the  distribution  of  family  benefits  is pro-poor.  As the
values  of the  concentration  coefficients  in  Table  1 show,  family  benefits  is  the  most
progressive  transfer.  The  two  transfers  in  which  we  are  particularly  interested  -
unemployment  benefits and social assistance-decrease  in importance  as one moves  from
the poorest  toward  the  middle-class,  and  then,  surprisingly,  increase.  Thus,  the  two
bottom  deciles  of  income  distribution  together  receive  only  11  percent  cf  social
assistance, and 20 percent  of unemployment  benefits.  The top decile receives  20 percent
of social assistance and 10 percent of unemployment benefits.  Social assistance  displays
a very high  positive concentration  coefficients  of +23, indicating  that it is strongly pro-
rich.  The  concentration  coefficient  of  unemployment  benefits  is  not  significantly
different from zero (+3) suggesting an almost flat distribution across income groups.
The incidence of social transfers  changes when individuals  are ranked according to
their  household  per  capita expenditures:  with  the exception  of  unemployment  benefits
and  other transfers,  they  all become  more targeted  on the poor.  This  represents  a true
improvement if we hold that expenditures  rather than incomes better  express the actual
level of welfare  (both because expenditures  reflect welfare,  and because  income  may be
underreported).  As Table 4.1b shows, the bottom two deciles now receive 20 percent  of
social  assistance,  and  26  percent  of  unemployment  benefits.  The  concentration
coefficient  of  social  assistance  also  improves:  it  declines  from  +23  to  +5.2,  still
remaining  slightly pro-rich.  Family  allowances  and  unemployment  benefits  remain the
only two pro-poor social transfers (note the negative concentration  coefficients).
4In  1998, a fanily  benefit, paid in respect of all children under  18, was 4 1/2 lats per month.
There are 10.3 percent  income-poor households; however, they comprise 29 percent of all children.
3Table  4.1a:  Distribution  of  income  sources  across  deciles  of population  (ranked  by per  capita  income)
Concent.  Share in total
Decile I  Decile 2  Decile 3  Decile 4  Decile 5  Decile 6  Decile 7  Decile 8  Decile 9  Decile 10  Cff.i  gross income
Coeffcient  (%)
Wages  f  2.22  4.40  6.31  6.50  6.56  7.48  9.98  11.78  17.04  27.73  36.9  58.1
Self employment (non-I
agro)  1.42  2.09  3.55  3.96  5.18  2.76  5.82  8.91  14.21  52.10  74.7  i.9
Self employment(agro)  0.46  1.56  2.00  2.33  2.73  2.91  3.43  7.54  ;2.43  64.62  UV.1  I.,
Home consumption  5.90  8.13  7.95  7.34  7  14  16.90  181  72 
Old-age pens  1.90  3.60  4.57  9.98  14.41  16.61  13.68  13.89  11.41  9.97  18.2  20.2
Otherpens  3.53  5.50  6.78  8.58  9.90  10.63  10.91  14.55  12.45  17.18  21.8  4.3
Family allowances  15.44  13.77  13.47  10.40  8.99  6.90  7.17  7.74  9.10  7.01  -14.8  2.3
Social assistance  6.60  5.07  8.40  6.64  9.88  6.96  11.28  11.45  13.59  20.13  23.0  0.3
UEB  12.60  8.39  13.63  10.24  4.57  11.16  13.98  5.22  9.62  10.61  -3.0  0.5
Other social  2.63  3.64  4.59  11.53  1.98  8.49  5.33  8.94  21.10  31.78  41.8  0.2
Priv. Cash transfers  2.53  3.06  4.25  3.50  4.15  5.20  8.44  10.63  15.94  42.31  52.1  3.1
Priv. Transfers in kind  4.62  6.29  6.84  6.67  6.14  6.94  11.02  12.50  14.56  24.42  28.8  4.7
Other income  5.28  7.66  8.13  7.83  10.27  8.24  13.44  12.39  10.57  16.19  15.6  1.2
Soc.sec. tax  2.36  4.73  7.03  6.92  7.03  8.45  10.33  12.16  16.68  24.33  3.7
PIT  1.48  3.16  .53  6.  25  8.18  !n3  12 si  18.04  28.25  7.3
Othertax  9.63  5.19  6.59  7.19  7.34  7.18  5.16  12.88  13.78  25.07  0.5
Gross income  2.79  4.60  5.95  6.98  7.87  8.91  10.16  11.92  14.89  25.93  32.8*  100
Taxes  2.13  3.75  6.06  6.48  6.54  8.22  10.14  12.42  17.41  26.85  37.2  11.5
Disposable income  2.87  4.69  5.94  7.04  8.03  8.99  10.17  11.86  14.60  25.82  88.5
Total transfers  3.52  4.84  5.85  9.78  12.95  14.63  12.64  13.26  11.43  11.10  15.9  27.8
Non-pension transfers  13.52  11.61  12.57  10.14  7.93  7.69  8.49  7.70  10.25  10.10  -6.5  3.3
SA + UEB  10.61  7.29  11.90  9.05  6.32  9.77  13.08  7.28  10.93  13.76  5.6  0.8
Note: Each  row  sums to 100.  SA=social  assistance.  UEB=unemployment  benefits.  *=Gini  coefficient.
4Table 4.1b: Distribution of income sources across deciles of population (ranked by per capita expenditure)
Decile I  Decile 2  Decile 3  Decile 4  Decile 5  Decile 6  Decile 7  Decile 8  Decile 9  Decile 10  Concent.
Coefficients
Wages  3.31  4.81  6.42  7.11  8.03  8.18  10.10  12.49  15.04  24.51  31.1
Self employment (non-  2.44  2.54  4.08  1.91  7.10  10.08  12.75  5.88  18.43  34.79  19.5
agro)
Self employment (agro)  2.68  7.24  8.92  9.28  9.30  10.12  6.09  24.53  7.26  14.59  46.3
Home consumption  6.04  9.38  9.53  9.00  9.38  11.18  10.38  10.71  11.94  12.47  8.9
Old-age pens  5.11  6.58  7.59  8.91  11.54  12.65  12.93  12.89  11.80  9.99  11.7
Other pens  5.64  7.09  7.83  9.52  8.58  11.36  10.99  10.97  13.61  14.41  15.3
Family allowances  15.49  13.87  12.54  10.66  9.76  8.96  7.78  7.78  7.62  5.53  -16.4
Social assistance  10.67  9.17  8.58  14.40  6.36  6.04  4.79  19.42  7.49  13.08  5.2
UEB  10.98  14.99  7.05  11.28  5.06  7.05  14.28  6.63  10.24  12.43  -0.9
Other social  6.03  4.27  0.98  9.57  7.14  3.84  3.61  10.74  17.61  36.20  42.2
Priv. Cash transfers  3.89  3.19  4.25  4.69  3.90  6.00  10.92  12.76  18.23  32.17  44.0
Priv. Transfers in kind  3.78  5.09  5.58  6.43  7.57  7.51  9.53  11.39  15.78  27.34  33.6
Other income  5.67  5.96  9.82  7.61  9.37  9.69  9.18  13.25  13.07  16.38  17.0
Soc.sec. tax  2.52  4.58  6.33  6.68  8.02  8.31  10.63  13.02  16.12  23.80
PIT  1.96  3.68  5.29  5.85  7.66  7.73  10.21  13.33  17.22  27.05
Other tax  4.37  4.20  8.92  6.76  7.80  7.37  9.42  16.23  14.08  20.86
Gross income  4.21  5.86  7.08  7.73  8.74  9.39  10.38  12.94  13.65  20.02  22.8
Taxes  2.25  3.99  5.78  6.16  7.78  7.90  10.31  13.36  16.73  25.73  36.1
Disposable income  4.44  6.08  7.23  7.91  8.85  9.57  10.39  12.89  13.29  19.36
Totaltransfers  6.21  7.43  7.99  9.25  10.73  11.92  12.09  12.10  11.71  10.57  9.9
Non-pension transfers  13.81  13.11  10.65  11.00  8.58  8.11  8.35  8.70  8.62  9.07  -8.7
SA+UEB  10.88  13.07  7.56  12.31  5.49  6.72  11.14  10.86  9.33  12.65  1.1
Note: Each  row  sums  to 100.  SA=social  assistance.  UEB=unemployment  benefits.
5Table 4.1c: Distribution of income sources across deciles of population (ranked by equivalent adult expenditure; theta=0.8)
Decile I  Decile  2  Decile  3  Decile  4  Decile  5  Decile  6  Decile  7  Decile  8  Decile  9  Decile 10
Wages  3.15  4.53  5.69  6.84  7.73  7.82  10.09  13.01  15.96  25.17  31.7
Selfemplovment(non-  2.76  2.76  3.26  2.79  3.72  11.69  13.69  7.48  17.19  34.66  47.7
agro)
Self;np1loyment(agro)  2.69  6.07  5.78  1105  8.92  9.04  8.83  8.52  23.49  15.62  24.7
Home.  consutmption 1  5.62  9.00  9.24  9.19  8.59  11.21  12.06  10.93  12.05  12.11  8.6
Old-age  pens  6.74  8.00  9.91  10.91  10.96  13.32  11.73  11.10  9.74  7.59  2.7
Other  pens  6.73  6.77  8.21  9.96  9.33  10.46  12.07  11.30  11.73  13.45  11.3
Family  allowances  12.79  13.12  10.89  10.79  10.06  8.59  9.83  7.87  8.07  7.99  -10.7
Social  assistance  10.36  11.05  11.47  7.62  10.35  3.07  20.87  6.10  6.95  12.18  -1.1
UEB  12.04  11.86  10.00  7.00  12.43  6.99  7.54  8.58  10.43  13.13  -2.9
Other social  4.35  5.96  0.00  8.00  6.75  5.08  3.75  15.53  13.93  36.66  42.2
Priv. Cashtransfers  4.05  3.37  4.75  4.78  5.71  5.81  11.23  12.94  17.54  29.81  39.6
Priv.Transfersinkind  4.11  5.19  5.71  5.95  7.86  7.58  10.10  11.91  14.65  26.93  31.2
Other  income  5.44  5.68  10.11  9.46  9.28  9.34  9.12  14.20  11.78  15.59  14.7
Soc.sec.  tax  2.28  4.23  5.78  6.43  7.69  7.66  10.57  14.20  17.02  24.13  33.3
PIT  1.77  3.50  4.72  5.73  7.14  7.24  10.45  14.01  18.38  27.05  38.7
Othertax  4.10  4.15  5.82  8.97  9.19  7.30  8.79  15.41  15.53  20.74  26.1
Gross  income  4.41  5.84  6.90  8.08  8.48  9.23  10.59  11.90  14.68  19.89  21.6
Taxes  2.04  3.76  5.11  6.10  7.41  7.37  10.42  14.14  17.82  25.83  36.4
Disposable  income  4.68  6.08  7.10  8.31  8.61  9.45  10.61  11.64  14.31  19.20  19.6
Total transfers  7.36  8.32  9.67  10.63  10.63  12.22  11.58  10.80  9.93  8.88  3.0
Non-pension  transfers  11.98  12.33  10.15  9.76  10.27  7.68  9.98  8.30  8.71  10.85  -5.8
SA + UEB  11.48  11.59  10.49  7.20  11.74  5.69  11.95  7.76  9.27  12.82  -2.3
Note: Each  row sums  to 100.  Expenditure  per equivalent  adult  calculated  as total expenditure  divided  by (household  size)^0.8, where  0=0.8 is a coefficient  of economies  of
scale. SA=social  assistance.  UEB=unemployment  benefits.
6But  we  still  assume  absence  of  economies  of  scale.  If  we  now  make  a  further
assumption  that the correct  ranking criterion  is equivalent  expenditures  and  use  (rather
conservatively)  a coefficient for economies of scale of 0=0.8, we get the results in Table
4.1c. Now, the percentage  of  poor individuals  (calculated using the semi-official  line of
Lats 28 per person per month) is only 11.3, and they (or more exactly the bottom decile)
receive 7.4 percent of total social transfers,  almost  13 percent  of family  allowances  (less
than with per capita rankings that which to place families with children  in lower income
groups),  10 percent  of social assistance,  12 percent of unemployment  benefits etc.  The
targeting  of  all  social  transfers  except  family  benefits  improves.  The  concentration
coefficient of social assistance now becomes mildly pro-poor (-1.1).
The  most  remarkable  change  takes  place  in  targeting  of  old-age  pensions  and
family benefits.  When households  are ranked by their per capita income or expenditures,
family allowances  appear strongly pro-poor,  old-age pensions  strongly pro-rich.  This is
the usual finding in many poverty assessments.  To a large extent,  it stems from the fact
that in any per capita ranking large households are generally found poor, and since large
households  are often households with many children in respect  of whom family benefits
are paid, family benefits appear well targeted.  The opposite is true for pensions paid in
respect  of  the  elderly  who  typically  live  in  small  households;  using  per  capita
measurements the latter are often ranked as relatively  well-off.  But when we adj ust for
both  economies  of size and lower cost of children  (using 0 of 0.8 and 0.6 as in Figure
4.1), the rankings of large and small households change, and consequently  does targeting
of pensions  and  family  benefits.  Now,  at 0=0.8  pensions  seem to  be  an  almost  flat
benefit  (concentration  coefficient  close to  0),  while  family  allowances  turn  out  to  be
much less progressive  (Figure 4.1).  With a sharper allowance  for economies  of scales
(0=0.6), targeting of the two transfers becomes the same.
7Figure 4.1: Concentration  coefficients  of old-age penrsions  and family benefits using
different  ranking  criteria
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Note: Positive values of thie  concentration coefficient imply that the transfer is pro-rich;  negative, that it is pro-poor.  A
flat transfer  (same across income spectrum) will have a concentration coefficienit equal to 0.
We can rmake two conclusions.  First, even leaving aside pensions,  the distribution
of  social  transfers  is  almost  flat:  it  does  not  seem  to  be  targeted  on  the  poor.  For
example,  the  bottom  decile  of  the  population  receives  10.6  percent  of  combined
unemployment  benefits  and social assistance  when people  are ranked by household  per
capita income; that share goes to  10.9 percent when ranked by expenditure per capita, and
finally to 11.5 when adijustment for economies of scale, is introduced.
Second,  the  targeting  of  the  key  presumed  pro-poor  transfers  (unemployment
benefits and social assistance) improves  if individuals  are rcanked  by their household  per
capita expenditures rather than by per capita incomes.  It imiproves further when we use a
relatively mild adjuistmirent  for economies of scale.
However-,  the, overall improvement in targeting i.s slight, and the performance of the
key pro-poor transfers is disappointing: both social assistance and unemployment  benefits
are either neutral  or slightly pro-rich.  The only  consistently  pro-poor transfer  is family
allowances.
84.2  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LATVIA'S  SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SYSTEM 6
Eligibility  for  social  assistance.  Because  there  is  no  official  poverty  line  in
Latvia, we had to base our analysis on poverty incidence on some quasi- or semi-official
poverty lines which  have been in use.  We take a poverty line of 28 LVL per person  (at.
October 1997 prices) in order to run the poverty profile analysis.  That line is equal. to 1/2
of the official  Minimum Crisis basket, and is close to  3/4 of the food component  of MCB.
7 We further assume that a household would, in principle, qualify  for social assistance  if
its monthly per capita expenditures were less than 28 LVL  ($48 or $PPP90 at the time of
the survey.8
Definition  of  social  assistance.  There  are  difference  in  coverage  of  social
assistance  between  the  Household  Budget  Surveys  and  the  official  definition  of what
constitutes  social  assistance.  The  HBS  definition  is  more  restrictive.  As  Table  4.2
illustrates,  the difference resides  in non-coverage  of benefits  in kind  (housing  benefits,
social care benefits and rehabilitation)  by the HBS.  This is, of course, a common feature
of most household  surveys  since they  seldom include  in-kind  benefits  like  orphanage,
kindergartens etc.  Housing benefits are similarly difficult to cover because most of them
are paid directly by municipalities to housing authorities.  However, as far as cash
benefits  provided  by  local  authorities,  the  HBS  questionnaire  covers  all  categories:  it
includes  cash housing  benefit, health  (care) benefit,  low-income  family  cash benefit and
other benefits 9
The poor.  14.6 percent of households  would thus qualify for social assistance:  6.4
percent  of household  are both income-  and  expenditure-poor  (called hard-core  poor).  10
8.2 percent  of households  are only  expenditure-poor  and  3.9  percent  only  income-poor
(see Table 4.3).
6 A very detailed discussion of social assistance (e.g. eligibility,  allocation rules, role of municipal authorities, intra-
regional allocation of funds etc.) was recently provided by Goldman.(1998).
7 This amount, in turn, is also close to the minimum pension (LVL 30) which is used as the poverty line in Pola:nd and
Hungary.
8  According to the 1995 Welfare Law, the minimum nation-wide poverty line is 26 lats per month. However, the local
authorities can set  higher poverty lines, and most usually do (e.g. in 1999, the eligibility threshold in Riga was :35 lats).
Thus,  the eligibility threshold of 28 lats assumed here is a good approximation to the actual policy. A person's
eligibility for social assistance (status of a "low- income person")  lasts for three months and is then reviewed.
9 There is one small difference: we have included funeral benefits as "other benefits", while the official classification
treats them as social assistance.
II  The correlation  between expenditure-poor (POORX) and income-poor (POORY)  is only 0.47; the correlation
between per capita income and expenditures is a relatively low  0.40.
9Tabl.e 4.2: Differences  between the official and HBS definition of social assistance
Name of benefit  Explanation  Official  Included
definition  in the
HBS
definition
1. Social benefits (paid by Local
Authorities;  based on tlhe 1995
Welfare Law)
Low-income family benefit  Maximum payment 2]. lats.  Yes  Yes
In cash and in-kind
Housing benefit  In cash, or in kind (paid  Yes  Yes (only
directly to utilities  or  in cash)
__________  municipal  housing  aulhoritieos)
Care benefit  If elderly or child carc: needed.  Yes  Yes
Only in cash
Funeral benefit  Yes  No (other
benefits)
Additional benefits  Yes  Yes
2. Social care benefits  For the elderly, childrzn  Yes  No
(kindergartens, orphanages)
etc. All in kind. Paid out of
central and LA funds.
3.  Rehabilitation  benefit  =  =  Yes  No
Table 4.3: Latvia: Who receives social assistance?
Total  Eligible for assistance  N-ot  eligible for assistance
(expenditure-poor)  (non-poor)
All households  1l00  14.6  85.4
Receiving  SA  1.5  0.35  1.15
Income-poor  10.3  6.4  3.9
Receiving  SA  100  23.1  76.9
Receiving  assistance  Not  receiving  assistance
All poor  1100  2.0  98.0
Hard core poor  100  0.0  100
All non poor  11)0  1.4  98.6
Note: Hard-core  poor are defined  as both income-  and expenditure-poor.
SA=social  assistance.
10Figure 4.2: Latvia: Percentage of  households recipients of social assistance by level
of welfare (expenditure  per capita)
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Who are the recipients  of social assistance?  Figure  4.2 illustrates  where  along
the income distribution  spectrum  are the recipients  of  social assistance. 11 A mere  1.5
percent  of households  report  receiving  social assistance  (see  the line  drawn  at  y=1.5).
Among the poor, the share  of social assistance  recipients  is 2 percent; among  the non-
poor, 1.4 percent (Table  4.3).  Figure 4.2 displays the already noted lack of targeting of
social assistance: the percentage of recipients (or differently put, the probability of receipt
of  social  assistance)  is  about  constant  up  to  the  80th  percentile.  What  is  most
extraordinary is that not a single hard-core poor household of which there are 6.4 percent
receives social assistance.
All households who are to the right of the x=1 5 line are non-poor,  and should not in
principle  receive  social  assistance.  Everything  to  the  right  of  that  line  is  therefore
"leakage."  In terms  of the number  of recipients,  76.9 percent  of them are not  qulalified
(see  Table  4.3).  In  terms  of  money  amounts,  76.7  percent  of  social  assistance  is
"leakage"  (Table 4.4).
How much do the recipients get? Figure 4.3 shows the average amounts of social
assistance  in lats (LVL).  On average,  a recipient  household  would  receive  $45 (or 26
LVL;  see  the horizontal  line  in  Figure  4.3) per  month,  with  both  poor  and  non-poor
households receiving about the same.  There is therefore not much difference between the
poor  and  non-poor  either  in  terms  of  access  to  social  assistance  or  the  amounts  they
"  Social assistance is the assistance provided by  municipalities. It includes housing benefit, health cash benefit, low-
income family cash benefit and other benefits.
11receive.  The amounts are, as we have just seen, about the same.  As for the probability of
receiving  social assistance it is only  marginally higher among the poor (2 percent)  than
among the non-poor (1.4 percent).
Figure 4.3: Latviia:  Amounts  of received  social assistance  (in LVL per recipient household
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IIow  muelh of  the poverty  gap is closed  by solcial iassistance?  Total  monthly
expenditure'-based pcove3^ty  gap calculated from the Survey is'LVL  32,500 as compared to
total monthly expenditu]res of slightly over LVL I million, or income of  LVL 1.1 million
(Table 4.4).  Thuis,  to close the entire poverty gap one Avould  need to transfer to the poor
and to the poor  only  3.1 percent  of total  population  expendlitures.  This  is a relatively
large poverty gal) a reflection of a rather high poverty line we use.  Total disbursed  social
assistance (in thev  sarnple) amounted to LVL 2,882 or less than  1/10 of the poverty  gap.
However, only 23 percent of that amount was paid to the poor, therefore "covering"  only
2 percent of the poverty gap.  12 Note that almost noile of the poverty gap among the
bottom 5 percent of the population is covered (Figure 4A4).
How much of total expenditures is financed by social assistance?  Social
assistance "paid"  for about 0.3 percent of total population expenditures.  Among the poor,
the ratio is 0.8 percent, among the non-poor, 0.28 perceent. Devspite  these low overall
12 The average social assistance-to-poverty  gap ratio calculated across households is 4.6 percent. The difference stems
from the fact that  smatll  poverty gaps -as  we move right toward less poor !iouseholds-are  "covered"  more fully than
the very large poverty gaps (see Figure 4.4).
12Table 4.4: Latvia: social assistance:  reduction  of the poverty gap and "leakage"
Total  The poor  The non
poor
Amounts in lats p.m.  (from Survey)
Social assistance  2,882  671  2,2L 1
(100)  (23.3)  (76.7)
Expenditures  1,009,696  83,152  926,544
Expenditure  of those with SA>O  14,694  1,984  12,710
Income  1,100,363  131,203  969,1 60
Poverty gap  32,551  32,551
Social assistance as percentage  of.
Expenditures  0.29  0.81  0.24
Expenditure of those with SA>O  19.6  33.8  17.4
Income  0.26  0.51  0.23
Poverty gap  8.9  2.0
Social assistance per recipient  26.2 ($45)  25.4 ($44)  26.4 ($46)
household (LVL/ $ p.m.)
Expenditure  per capita of those with  $81  $36  $98
social assistance ($ p.m.) a/
Memo: Expenditure  per capita (overall  $92  $39  $126
average $ p.m.) a/
Average HH size (overall average)  2.36  3.13  2.23
Notes: In  October 1997 prices. Exchange  rate: LVL 0.58=$1.
p.m. = per month. SA=social assistance. HH=household.
a/ Mean across households.
amounts, the importance of social assistance for the recipient households  was substantial:
it covered one-third  of expenditures  of poor households  and  17 percent  of the non-poor
(Table 4.4).
The big  difference  between  the share  of social assistance  in  overall  expenditures
(0.3 percent)  and  in  the  expenditures  of  recipients  (almost  20  percent)  indicates  that
social assistance  was  distributed  in relatively  large  chunks  and to  a few  people.  And
indeed,  the  average  recipient  household  received  almost  $45  as  against  an  average
unemployment  benefit  of $60 pm 3,  or average  wage of slightly  over $200 pm.  As we
shall in the next Section, Latvia's  social assistance can be considered "concentrated."
The poor who  do not receive social assistance.  98 percent  of the poor received
no social assistance.  The percentage of the excluded (the poor who do not receive social
assistance) does not vary with welfare as one moves toward the less poor the percentage
of exclusion stays about the same (see Figure 4.6).
13  Both calculated from the Survey. There are 2.6 percent of all households who are receiving unemployment benefits.
13Figure 4.4: Latvia: Social assistance received as percentage ofthe  poverty gap by level of






0  0  o  0
0  10  15
acC. to tothhx_p
Note: Mean calculated  across households.
4.3  PERFORMAIANCE  OF LATVIA'S  SOCIAL  ASSISTANCE:  COMPARISON  WITH  OTHER
TRANSITON  COUNTRIES
Features  of  ithe system.  Using  the  approach  from  Braithwaite,  Grootaert  and
Milanovic  (2000), vve compare Latvia's  social assistance to the social assistance  systems
of five transition  countries  (Bulgaria,  Hungary,  Estonia,  Poland  and  Russia).  We note
first  an exceptionally  rnodest level of social assistance.  Fewer households  (1.5 percent)
receive  social  assistance  in Latvia  than in  any of  the other five  countries  (Table  4.5).
Social  assistance  finances  less  of  household  expenditures  (0.29  percent)  than  in  any
country save Bulgaria.  If we compare Estonia and Latvia, whose systems are, as we shall'
see below, similar, the percentage of households  receiving assistance  is almost two times
as  large  in  Estonia,  and  the  importance  of  assistance  in  relation  to  population
expenditures is greater,
But  while  Latvia's  social  assistance  is  extremely  modest  in  its  size, .,it  is
concentrated:  those  w]ho receive  social assistance,  get in Latvia  (in  dollar terms)  more
than elsewhere,  except in Poland.  Further,  social assistance covers  almost 20 percent  of
recipient  householdls expenditures,  again a proportion  higher than  in any  other country
except Poland.
14Figure 4.5: Latvia: Social assistance as percentage of expenditures  by level of welfare
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Note: Mean calculated  across households.
Performance  of  the  system.  How  does  Latvia's  system  perform  compared  to
other countries?  In order  to make  this  comparison  meaningful,  we  cannot  base  it on
different poverty lines: the very fact that a country might have a low or a high poverty
line (compared  to  its mean expenditures)  will influence the calculated efficiency  of the
system.  For example,  if the poverty  line is very low, the  "eligible"  population  will be
small, many  poor  may receive  social  assistance  ("the  error  of exclusion"  will  also  be
small), and much of the poverty gap may be eliminated (thus showing high effectiveness
too).  The country may seem to perform very  well but most  of it may be  due to a very
austere poverty  line which  severely  limits eligibility  for assistance.  If the poverty line
were raised, both the error of exclusion and the coverage of the poverty gap may decline,
but  in  reality  the poor  would  be  better  off.  Therefore,  in order  to  compare  diifferent
countries,  we need to assume  that the objective  of the social  assistance  system  iin each
country is the same.  As in Braithwaite,  Grootaert and Milanovic  (2000), we assume that
the  poor  in  each  country  are  the bottom  ten percent  of the  population14 and  that  the
objective of social assistance is to help them.  The success of the social assistance system
is then measured by how much of the (pre-assistance) poverty gap of the bottom decile is
eliminated  (effectiveness),  and  how much of disbursed  social  assistance  is received  by
them (efficiency).
14 Ranked  according  to expenditures  per capita.
15Figure  4.6: Latvia: Failure to deliver social assistance (percentage  of the poor who do not
receive social assistgnce)
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Consider lines 6 and 7 (Table 4.5), and Table 4.6.  Latvia's  results are poor.  Less
than 15 percent of social assistance is received by the poorest decile, a proportion inferior
to that of any country except Russia.  Since social  assistance is badly targeted, and total
amount of  spending  is small,  it is not  surprising  that  social  assistance  covers  only  2.9
percent of the poverty  gap of the bottom  decile the smallest  proportion  of all countries
except for Bulgaria.
Table 4.6 cornplements these results with  several additional  statistics.  We define
relative effectiveness  as the ratio between effectiveness,  and social  assistance  shown  as
percentage  of total  expenditures.  Here  again, Latvia performs  worse than  all countries
except Russia.  The. correlation  between social assistance  and household  percentile,  and
the social assistance  concentration  coefficient,  both of which  we expect to  be negative,
are, on  the contrary,  positive,  indicating  an  absence  of  a  focus  on  the  poor.  Similar
results obtain only in Russia, which according to all indicators  of performance  scores the
worst.
One of the objectives in Braithwaite,  Grootaert,  Milanovic  (2000) analysis  was to
determine the type of social assistance system exhibited by a country.  It was done using
three indicators: the level of the poverty  line (compared  to mean country expenditures),
percentage  of recipients of social assistance, and the importance  of social assistance  for
the recipient  households.  The characteristics  of Latvia's  system  are similar to those  of
Poland  and  Estonia:  small  percentage  of  recipients,  but  high  importance  of  social
assistance for those who get it (Table 4.7).  This implies that Latvia's  social assistance is
concentrated, although its focus  on the bottom decile is wieak  (Table 4.8).
16Table 4.5: Characteristics and performance  of social assistance systems
I Bulgaria  Estonia  Latvia  Poland  Russia  Hungary
System  characteristics
(1) % of HHs  2.55  2.7  1.5  3.7  13.0  24.4
receiving  SA
(2) SA as % of  0.11  0.38  0.29  0.74  0.45  1.1
expenditures
(3) SA per  10  33  45  54  5  17
recipient HH ($
pm)
(4) SA as % of  4.1  14.8  19.6  22.1  3.5  4.7
expend. Of
recipients HHs






(6) % of SA  22.3  34.7  14.8  20.5  8.2  27.2
received by the
lowest decile
(7) SA to the  1.3  7.0  2.9  9.4  3.3  28.8
bottom decile as
% of the poverty
gap  a/
Overall expenditures  and distribution
(8) Poverty gap  1.9  2.1  1.5  1.6  1.0  1.1
of the lowest
decile as % of
all expenditures




capita  in $ pm  b/







a/ Poverty  gap of the lowest decile.  The poverty  gap is expenditure-based  (after social assistance).
bf Household-weighted.
Note: Countries  ranked from left to right according  to the percentage  of households  who are receiving social
assistance.
SA=social  assistance.  HH=household.
Source:  all countries  but Latvia  from Braithwaite,  Grootaert  and Milanovic  (2000).
17Table 4.6: Comparing the performance of the social assistance systems
=  =  Hungary  Estcnia  Poland  Bulgaria  Latvia  Russia
Efficiency:  °/c  of SA received by the  27.2  34.7  20.5  22.3  14.8  8.2
lowest decile
Effectiveness:  SA as % of the poverty  28.8  7.0  9.4  1.3  2.9  3.3
gap of the lovvest  decile
Relative effectiveness  26.2  18.3  12.6  11.4  10.7  7.3
Correlation btw. SAPC  and perc_h  -0.13  -0.04  -0.06  -0.03  +0.01  +0.03
Concentration coefficient  a/  -25.8  -16.2  -19.8  -13.8  +5.2  +8.2
Note: Relative  effectiveness  is calculated  as the ratio  between effecti  'eness, and social assistance  as percentage  of total
expenditures.  Countries  are ranked  from left to right  according  to relative  effectiveness.  SA=social  assistance.
SAPC=social  assistance  per capita.  perc_h=percentiles  of households  formed  according  the household  per capita
expenditures.
Table 4.7: Characteristics of the systems
Poland  Bulgaria  Hungary  Estonia  Latvia  Russia
Poverty line  High  Low  High  Low  High  High
Percentage  of recipients  Low  Low  High  Low  Low  High
Importance of SA for  High  Low  Lc,w  High  High  Low
recipients
Type of system  HLH  LLL  HHL  LLH  HLH  HHL
H/L=level  of poverty  line: high/low  (over/under  50 percent of average  expenditures).
H/L=many  or few receive  SA (under/over  10 percent  of the population).
H/L=Social  assistance  (SA) is irnportant  (high) or not (low)  (under/over  10 percent  of recipients' expenditures).
Table 4.8: Taxonomy of social assistance: concentrated, dispersed, and irrelevant
Importance  of social assistance
Number of recipients  SA relatively  important for  SA relatively unimportant  for
recipients  recipients




High number of recipients  Hungary
Russia
_________  ______  _______________  __  [DISPERSED]
18In conclusion, Latvia's  social assistance is:
*  very  modest  as  the  overall  amounts  disbursed  and  number  of  households  who
benefit from it are small;
*  however,  for  the  recipients,  social  assistance  represents  an  important  source  of
income.  The system is therefore concentrated, a feature it shares with social assistance in
Poland and Estonia.
*  But while the system  is concentrated, it is not focused on the poor, and its relative
effectiveness is worse than in all countries considered here except Russia.
4.4  WHY SOME POOR HOUSEHOLDS  DO NOT RECEIVE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE?
We  have  seen  that  the  percentage  of  the  poor  who  are  not  receiving  social
assistance  ("error  of  exclusion")  is  about 98  percent.  Can  we  explain  who  and  why
among the  poor  is  "denied"  social  assistance?  In  other  words,  are there  identifiable
household  characteristics that account  for household's  exclusion?  Is it the fact that they
live in rural areas, own durables  (e.g. a car or a productive  asset),  have an able-bodied
male  living  in  the  household,  or  have  small  families?  Finding  out  what  these
characteristics are should give us a better grasp on the performance  of the system.  For
example, if single mothers are systematically discriminated,  that probably means that the
system  is operating  worse  than if households  with  able-bodied  male  (who  might  work
informally) are systematically excluded.  Also, it should  allow us to look more carefully
for the causes of exclusion.  For example, if urban areas are systematically  discriminated,
is it because there are no social assistance offices in the cities  or because the offices are
understaffed,  or perhaps  because the allocation  of central  funds is biased  against urban
areas?
Methodology.'5 We  want  to  estimate  econometrically  what  household
characteristics  are  associated  with  errors  of  exclusion.  We  cannot  estimate  such
regressions  simply  across  all  households  because  for  the  non-poor  we  cannot,  by
definition, observe  errors of exclusion.  We deal with  a censored sample. Differently,  to
run the regressions across the poor households only would yield biased estimates because
people  are not poor or non-poor randomly.  There are distinct  characteristics  which  are
often associated with poverty.  If that is the case, then, running  the regression  across the
sub sample of the poor would be tantamount  to disregarding  information  from the entire
sample, thus yielding  biased estimates.  For example, we  might  find when  running  the
regression  across  the poor  only that  the failure  to deliver  social  assistance  is  strongly
related to living in villages  (peasants do not get much social assistance).  But it could also
be that  living in  a village  is a strong  determinant.of  poverty  and once  we take  it into
account,  none  of  the  discrimination  against  peasants  per  se  remains.  The  same
exogenous variable  in our example (living  in a village) explains  both the poverty status
and the error of exclusion.  We need to distinguish between the two.  To do so,  we rin  a
selection model where  households  first "select"  to be in or out of poverty  (the so-called
"screening"  equation).  This is a probit regression  because the dependent  variable takes
the value of either  1 or  0 depending  on whether the household  is respectively  poo:r or
5 This section (Methodology)  is reprinted from Braithwaite, Grootaert, Milanovic (1999; Chapter 111).
19non-poor.  Then,  in  the  second  regression,  we  identify  factors  that  --for  the  poor
households  explain their exclusion from social assistance controlling now for the factors
that make people more likely to be poor.
We  have,  in  essence,  to  face  two  importani  econometric  problems:  the  use  of
limited  dependent  variable (binary variable in the first equation),  and the  selection bias
(people "select"  to be poor non-randomly).  The first problem  renders  OLS estimators
even asymptotically biased; the second problem also makes them biased.  We address the
selection  issue  by  using  the  Heckman  correction  (or  Hleckman selection  model);  we
address the  limited  dependent  variable problem  bv  applying  the  maximum  likelihood
(ML)  estimation.  We are  thus  able  to  obtain  unbiased  and  asymptotically  efficient
estimators. 16
More formally, we observe an error of exclusion only if  the household  is poor, that
is if
1SX 1 + Uj >  0
where  xl  is  a  vector  of  household  characteristics,  Pl=a  vector  of  and  ul=a
normally-distributed  random  error  term.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  another  equation
explaining the exclusion error:
FAILURE  =  ,82x2 +  au2
where  X2 is a vector of household characteristics,  f3 2=a vector of coefficients,  u2=a
normally-distributed  random  error term  potentially  correlated  with  the  first  error  term
(ul)  if u￿0.  The two vectors of household  characteristics (xi  and x2) must have at least
one different variable in order for the two equations to be identified.
Our first ("selection" into poverty) regression is:
(1)  I)POOR,  fct (HHSIZE, DEDUI, DEDU2, D]_DU3, AGE, AGE2, PRODUCA,
I)HOUISE,  SHRWAGEY,  DSEX, DLOC1, DLOC2, DLFS1, DLFS2)
where binaLry  (0-1) variables  are prefixed by a D standing for dummy variable, and
all variables are household-based,
DPOOR  =  poverty status (poor=1),
HHSIZE = household size,
DEDUL = dunmy  for primary education or less (of household head),
DEDU2 = dummy for secondary (general) educlation  of household head,
DEDU3=  dummy  for  secondary  vocational  or  technical  education  of  household  head
(omitted variable=university education),
16  Since we have a limited dependent variable  OLS estimators would be biased.  We thus need to use ML methods.
This is an improvement over the usual, and until recently more comrnon, Heckman two-stage estimation which solved
the problem of selection bias but, by not using maximum likelihood estimation, still yielded inefficient (even if
consistent) estimates. Until recently, using Heckman correction with ML methods was computationally  prohibitive.
20AGE = age of the household head,
PRODUCA = ownership of productive assets,
DHOUSE = dummy for tenancy status (vs. home ownership),
SHRWAGEY = share of wage income in total household income  (to proxy linkage
with labor market),
DSEX = dummy for female-headed household,
DLOCI = dummy for other cities,
DLOC2 = dummy for rural (omitted variable=capital city),
DLFS1 = dummy if household head is unemployed, and
DLFS2 = dummy if household head is inactive  (omitted variable=employed).
Our second  ("error of exclusion") regression is:
(2)  FAILURE  fct  (HHSIZE,  DEDUI,  DEDU2,  DEDU3,  AGE,  AGE2,
DURABLA, PRODUCA, DHOUSE, DSEX, DLOC1, DLOC2, DLFS1, DLFS2)
where all variables are the same except
FAILURE =  1 if  a household  is poor  and has received no  social assistance.  If
household  is  poor  and  has  received  social  assistance  FAILURE  =0;  for  all  non-poor
households, FAILURE is unobserved, and
DURABLA = index of ownership of consumer durables (a new RHS variable),
While  SHWAGEY  is dropped  for  identification  purposes.  The  rationale  is that
linkage  with  the  fornal  labor  market  (reflected  in  high  value  of  SHWAGEY)  irnight
explain whether the household  is poor or not poor, but not whether it is discriminated  in
the  allocation  of  social  assistance.  DURABLA  is  a  composite  index  of  durables
ownership.  It is obtained by assigning to the ownership of each consumer durable good a
value  of  1 and  then  summing  up  the  score  (e.g.  if  a  household  owns  a  TV  eaLd  a
refrigerator it would score 2).
Due  to the  potentially  important  role  that  family  composition  and  ownership  of
durables  might  have  when  deciding  whether  or not  to  deliver  social  assistance  (as  in
means- testing), we experiment with different formulations of the regressions.  In one set,
HHSIZE is replaced by the family composition  variables: number of the unemployed  in
the household  (UNEMPLN),  number of children (CHILDN)  and number of male  adults
(MADULTN).  In the second set, ownership of specific durables, e.g. ownership of a car;
black  and  white  TV  only,  refrigerator,  personal  computer  etc.  are  introduced  in  the
equation  instead  of  the  composite  durables  index.  The  equation  with  houseihold
composition  (instead  of  size) and  ownership  of  individual  durables,  for  example;  will
look like:
(3)  FAILURE  =  fct  (UNEMPLN,  CHILDN,  MADULTN,  DEDUI,  DEDU2,
DEDU3,  AGE,  AGE2,  DCAR,  DTV,  DPC,  DREFRIGERATOR,  DMICRO,
DSTEREO,  DMOTOR,  PRODUCA,  DHOUSE,  DSEX,  DLOCI,  DLOC2,  LFS1,
DLFS2)
21where the variables in bold show the ownership of various consumer durables.
Finally,  because of  the difference  in regiona]. approach  to  the delivery  of  social
assistance,  we  replace  location  variables  (DLOC 1  and  DLOC2)  with  four  regional
variables dummy variables (DREG1=Riga  region, DREG2=Kurzeme,  DREG3=Vitzeme,
DREG4=Zemgale, and omitted regional variable Latgale).
The results. Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 show the results of the errors-of-exclusions
regression.  Eight  regressions  are run  combining  the  following  three  formulations:  (i)
number  of hcusehold  members,  or household  composition,  (ii) location  or region,  and
(iii) index of durables owned or individual durable gcods.' 7
Note first the variables which are not significarLt. Level of education and sex of the
household  head, or his/her  age are not found to makce  more or less likely the receipt of
social assistance  in  any  of the eight  equations.  Simnilarly,  owning  a house  or being  a
tenant,  or having, owvn  business do not seem to matter.
Moreover, the regional variables which we find significant both as determinants of
poverty and unemployment  are not significant here.  Location, however,  is.  Table  4.9
and  Table 4.10  show  that urban  households,  both  those  living  in  Riga and  outside  of
Riga, are -after  controlling for all other characteristics-miore  likely to be excluded.  The
obverse  of this  is, of course,  that rural households  seem to  be  giveni preference  in  the
allocation of social assistance.  19
Greater nunmber  of male adults (above one) is another characteristic  correlated with
likelihood  of  being  denied  social  assistance.  It  seems  that  social  assistance  offices
consider  such farmilies better able to  find  alternative  means of  sustenance.  One might
recall that until  1968 when the Supreme Court struclk it out, a similar rule of "man in the
house" was used by the US welfare offices to deny social assistance to households  with
able-bodied males (see Levitan,  1990, p. 51).
In  one  formulation,  having  unemployed  head  makes  household  less  likely  to
receive social assistance.  The result may be driven by the fact that the while very modest
unemploymenit benefits may keep the family below the poverty line, the very receipt  of
the  benefit  renders  ithe family  de  facto  ineligible  for social  assistance.  20  Out  of  974
households who have, unemployed members (and out of wahich  302 are poor), only 21 are
in receipt of social assistance.
17 As the "error of exclusion" equation is modified (e.g. by including household composition instead of household size),
so is, in order  to maintain the conditions for the exact identification, tie first equation.
Is We cannot distinguish between rentors of public and private flats.
19  Using a poverty module attached to the 1998 HBS, the self-reported rejection rate (people who applied for social
assistance but were refised)  was 19 percent in urban, and 10 percent in rural areas (see Gassman and Neubourg  1999,
p. 45).
20 Replacement rate of unemployment benefits ranges from 50 perceni.  for those with 1-5 years of service, reaching 65
percent for those with more than 25 years of service. The average unemnployment  benefit received is some 30 percent of
the average wage, while the per capita poverty line is about IA  of the average wage. Thus, a four-member household
with one unemployed rnember, one member employed at less than 70 percent of the average wage, and two children
will fall under the poverty line.
22Ownership  of  durable  goods,  whether  measured  as  an  index,  or  as  individual
durables,  does  not  appear  to  have  an  impact  except  for the  ownership  of  refrigerator
which makes the household  more likely to benefit from social assistance.  21 It is unclear
why this should be the case.
Table 4.9: Explaining error of exclusion:  Regressions  with the index of durables
With three areas  With five regions




Poor who are  Urban outside of Riga*  Male adults*  Large households  Male adults
"discriminated"  Urban outside Riga  Unemployed  head*
against
k significant  No  No
Note: The first column under each country gives the results for the regression which uses household size as explanatory
variable; the second column gives the results using household composition.
HH=household.
All coefficients significant at 1% level unless otherwise * noted.
Table 4.10: Explaining  error of exclusion:  Regressions  with the individual durables
With three areas  With five regions
With HH size  With HH composition  With HH size  With HH composition
Poor who are  Ownership of  Ownership of
"discriminated"  refrigerator*  refrigerator*
in favor
Poor who are  Riga*  Male adults*  Large households  Male adults*
"discriminated"  Urban outside of Riga  Riga*
against  Urban  outside  of  Riga
X  significant_  _  _
Note: The first column under each country gives the results for the regression which uses household size as explanatc  ry
variable; the second column gives the results using household composition.
HH=household.
All coefficients significant at 1% level , unless otherwise * noted.
In  conclusion,  we  find  that  disbursement  of  social  assistance  displays  a  bias  in
favor  of  rural  areas,  although  no  regional  bias  could  have  been  detected.  'Social
assistance  offices also tend to  deny  assistance to  households  with  more than one  adult
male or headed by an unemployed  person.  Other than for the rural inhabitants,  no other
types of households,  such as those headed by females, or by the elderly, or by the more
educated, are found to be "discriminated  in favor."
Of all consumer durables, refrigerator is by far the most commonly owned: 91 percent of all households,,  and
81 percent of poor households, own it.
234.5  REGIOPiAL  INEQUALITY IN DISTRIBUTION  OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
Regional inequality in the allocation of social assistance has repeatedly been raised
as an issue (see Goldiman 1998; World Bank,  1995).  This is also the problem  of which
the Government has  been aware.  Regional inequities essentially  stem from the way that
the system of social  assistance is organized  and  furnded. Like in most  countries,  social
assistance in 'Latvia is administered  at the local  level.  But,  in addition,  the funding  of
social assistance  is to  some  extent  localized.  Local  governments  receive  block  grants
from the Center throuigh the Equalization and also raise their own funds. They are free to
allocate both centrally-provided ands local funds for amy  use, depending  on what they see
as being a priority. Spending on education, health and public services thus competes with
spending  on1 social  assistance.  In  principle,  this  approach  is  reasonable.  First,
Equalization  fund should ensure that poorer  local governmnents  receive more funds than
the rich, thus ensuring regional equity. Second, because local governments  should  know
best what are local needs, the freedom to allocate money (that is, not to have earmarked
uses) may be desirable.  However, both points can also be questioned.  First, Equalization
fund may not  ensure horizontal  (that is, regional)  equity.  Second,  even if  Equalization
fund achievecl this  objective with respect to total  secial  spending,  it may not achieve it
with  respect  to social  assistance.  The poor  often  lack political  power  to  "force"  local
governments  to spend more on social assistance. Thus, reliance, in part, on local funding
for  social  spending,  plus  lack  of poor's  political  clout  in  the  allocation  of  spending,
implies  that there  are serious  dangers  of horizontal  inequity:  individuals  with  the same
characteristics (e.g. low income level) may be treated differently  depending on what part
of the country they live in.
We shall try  to check this  hypothesis  using two  approaches.  In the first,  we use
Household  Budget  cdata  to  obtain an  estimate  of territorlial distribution  of the need  for
social assistanice (approximated  by the number of the poor) and its actual distribution.  In
the second approach., we use very desegregated data on social assistance from more than
500 local  governments  to  contrast  them with  some  demrographic characteristics  of  the
population.  This is, of course, far from perfect  because demographic  characteristics  do
not imply "need".  Unfortunately,  we cannot contrast the allocation of social assistance at
the local level with poverty at the same level-as  ideally we would like because HBS data
are not  representative  at that  level  (and  indeed  are not  even  presented),  and  poverty
headcount cannot be calculated.
By conibining five regional  (Riga, Kurzeme, 'Vidzeme, Zemgale,  and Latgale) and
three local (large cities,  small cities, rural areas) classifications  from Household Budget
Surveys, plus Riga city, we obtain sixteen regional  units.  One of them is empty (Vitgale
large city), so we are left with  15 regional HBS units (see Table 4.11).  For each of them
we  calculate  from  -IBS, poverty  headcount,  and  the  disbursed  poverty  assistance  per
capita (Table 4.11).  One can then obtain disbursed social assistance per poor person, that
is  social  assistance  per  unit  of "needs."  Latvia-wide,  social  assistance  spending  was
about  1 lat per month  per poor person.  22 However,  eight regions  are severely  "under-
provisioned": social assistance per poor person is less than 50 percent of Latvia-wide
22 Note that this is an average of social assistance disbursed and number of the poor. Since not all social assistance is
disbursed to the roor only, a poor person will not receive on average  I lat per month.
24Table 4.11: Poverty headcounts and allocation  of social assistance  by regions
(based on HBS data and HBS regional units)
(1)  (2)  (3)
Poverty headcounts  Social assistance  per  Social assistance per
(in %)  person (lats per  poor person (lats per
month)  month)
(2): (1)
Riga city  10.8  0.066  0.61
Rig  areca
Lagcity  (Jurm~ala  31.0000
Small citi,es  20.  i0.0l3  0.06
Rural areas  16.3  1.211  7.45
Kurzeme
Large citv (Liepaja)  14.7  0.240  1.64
S5Mal  cities228002.5
Rural areas  3
Zemgale
Large city (Jelgava)  15.3  0.077  0.50
Small cities  19.0  0.289  1.52
Rural areas  24.1  0.545  2.26
Latgale
Large cities (Daugavpils,  23.4  0.121  0.52
Rezekne)
Small, cities  25,  0.930  0J,
Total Latvia  19.4  0.191  0.98
level.  The "underprovisioned  regions"  are: in the Riga area, Jurmala and small cities; in
the Kurzeme, Vidzeme  and Latgale areas, small cities and rural areas. On the other h.and,
rural areas around Riga, rural areas in Zemgale,  or the city of Liepaja  receive between
11/2  and  7 times  as  much  as Latvia-wide  average.  We can conclude  not  only  thal: the
distribution seems to be uneven but also that a generalization based  on location (rural vs.
urban  areas)  is  not  a  strong  predictor  of  what  areas  do  not  receive  sufficient  social
assistance.  While,  for  example,  small cities  and rural  areas in  Kurzeme,  Vidzeme  and
Latgale  disburse  inadequate  amounts  of  social  assistance,  rural  areas  in  Zemgale  and
around Riga receive far more than their "needs" seem to be.
The geographic  map  of Latvia  enclosed  below  shows  that  the  underprovisioned
areas include all Eastern  districts (rajons),  and several (four) in the West of the country.
The region in the Center  of the country,  around Riga and  in the South, is better  off in
terms of received social assistance. 23
23 White-shaded districts receive social assistance per poor person that is less than 50% of country-wide average. The
districts where the major (republican) cities are, are "allocated"  to the group to which the city belongs (e.g. spending
levels in Liepaja, see Table 4.t 1, determine the shading of the Liepaja district). The "unallocated"  districts straddle two
25Latviat: Map of regional  distribution  of social assistance  per poor person
z, SocialAssistance  by  Region Latvia
Administrative  Divisions  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(Lats  per  poor  person  per  year)
- Inernticoal bKondary
- Prvince (rajons)  boundary
*  tatroraI capiti  more  than  1.0
*  Province ~~~~~~~~~  ~~  '  2  '~~~~~' ~unallocated
The  undentsed  city  n,ames  a,, mtanravifties
that h,iwe  status  equal  to that  caraons,
o  25  50  oCbretts
o  ~~~~~~~Gulff
~~~  R~~~~ ~of 
Riga  2425 




1IAIZK~RAWKLES  R~AJONS 10 JELGAVAS  RAJONS  19 REZEKNES  RAJONS
2 ALDKSNES  RAJOIiS  I1 IKRASLAVAS  RAJONS 20  RilGAS  RAJONS
3 RALVU  RIJONS  12 KULDFIGAS  RAJONS  21 SALOUS  RAJONS
4  BAUSKAS  RAJONS  13 UEPkJAS  RAJONS  22 TAX.SU  RAJONS
5  CSU RAJONS  14 LIMBAU  RAJONS  23 TUKUMA  RAJONS
6-OAUGAVPiLS  RAJONS  15 LUDZAS  RAJONS  24  VAUKAS  RAJONS
7DO20ELES  RAJONS  16 MADONAS  RAJONS  25 VALMIERAS  RAJONS
B GULBENES  RAJONS  17 OGRES  RAJONS  26 VENTSPILS  RAJONS
9  JEKABPILS  RAJO1NS  18 PREIJU  RAJONS
Omn  6026200  176Ot  -296
regionis  with different importance of social assistance; we thus could not precisely determine their correct level of
social assistance received.
26The HBS regions need to be mapped into the local government  (LG) level at which
social  assistance  is  administered  and  funded.  This  presents  somewhat  of  a  problem
because in a few cases, a given district can "belong"  to two traditional  regions used in the
Household  survey. At the level of towns and rural parishes (pagasts), however,  there are
no such problems:  each pagast  can be mapped  into one  of  15 HBS  regions.  Annex  2
shows  the  detailed  "mapping"  with  cells  belonging  to  the  under-provisioned  areas
shaded.  In total,  we find  that only  one  large  city (Jurmala)  receives  insufficient  social
assistance;  70  cities  and  towns,  and  338  pagasts  (see  Table  4.13  top  panel).  Iotal
population  living in the underprovisioned  areas amounts to 934,000 people or 38 percent
of Latvia's  population.  Out of these people, 876 thousands  live in towns and rural areas
(72 percent  of all population  living in towns  and villages),  and  60,000  in Jurmala  (the
sole underprovisioned  republican city).
The conclusion  regarding  what are the underprovisioned  regions  according  to the
HBS  data  can  be  contrasted  with  what  are  the  underprovisioned  regions  using
information obtained from the Ministry of Social Welfare. The Ministry  has provided the
Bank mission with the very detailed data on the 1998 total allocation  of social assistance
by almost 560 cities, towns and pagasts.  Social assistance is defined more broadly  than
in the HBS (see Table  4.2). Broadly defined social assistance  includes  (1) cash  and in-
kind  transfers  disbursed  in  accordance  with  the  Law  on  Social  Assistance,  namely
general  low-income  support,  cash and in-kind payment  for rents  and utilities,  for wood
and coal, for the care of children and the aged, and funeral allowance, and (2) other social
care  benefits  like  free  food,  free medical  help  (hospitals,  drugs  etc.),  and  support  for
children and family (free textbooks,  kindergartens,  school transport  etc.). In Table 4.12,
we  use  two  definitions  of  social  assistance:  spending  based  on  the  Law  on  Social
Assistance (point 1 above) and total spending (sum of points  1 and 2), and express it both
per capita and per person of non-working age.
First,  total  social  assistance  (broad  concept)  is  twice  as  large  as  narrow  social
assistance (disbursed  in accordance with the Social Assistance  Law): average  per capita
spending  on  broad  social  assistance  was  Lats 4.7  per  year  vs.  about Lat  2.3 for  the
narrow concept. Social assistance transfers thus represent about 0.6 percent  of population
income calculated from  HBS.  The narrow  concept  of social assistance  accounts for  0.3
percent  of  total  income,  a  percentage  which  is  exactly  the  same  as  obtained  from
Household surveys (see Table 4.1a above).
Second,  inequality  in  distribution  of  social  assistance  is  substantial.  Whatever
concept  of social  assistance  or recipient  used,  the  Gini  coefficients  is  high.  It  ranges
between  48  and  57.  A  note  of  caution  is  in  order  here.  Even  under  the  theoretical
hypothesis  of  perfect  targeting,  inequality  would  still  be  present,  and  possibly  high,
because  the poor  are not  evenly  distributed  across  the  country.  Moreover,  we  do  not
know if the existing high Gini is high because the poor areas are well targeted or because
most of the money  is disbursed  to the rich areas. Therefore,  the Gini coefficient  simply
shows  high  inequality  in  the  allocation.  It  says  nothing  whether  that  inequality  is
"justified"  or not.
27Table 4.12: Distribution  of social assistance  across local governments  in 1998
Social assistance  (narrow  concept)  Social assistance  (broad concept)
Per capita  Per non-  Per capita  Per non-
working person  working person
Mean (lats p.a.)  2.29  4.86  4.70  9.94
Standard  deviation  (lats  4.57  9.23  7.58  15.41
p.a.)
Coefficient  of variation  1.99  1.90  1.61  1.55
Gini coefficient  56.8  53.4  51.7  48.3
Local govt's with lowest  Balgales  Balgales  Balgales  Balgales
disbursements  Blontu  Blontu  Rojas  Rojas
Pavilostas  Pavilosta  Kraslava  Kraslava
Remtes  Remtes  Dobele  Dobele
Rojas  Rojas  Aizkraukle  Berzaunes
Local govt's with highest  Valmieras  Dobeles  Balvu  Balvu
disbursements  Dobeles  Valmieras  Dobeles  Dobeles
Aizkraukles  Aizkraukles  Aizkraukles  Aizkraukles
Balvu  Balvu  Valmieras  Valmieras
Kraslavas  Kraslavas  Kraslavas  Kraslavas
Source: Data provided by the Ministry of Welfare.
Note: Total of 553 local governments.
Third, inequality in distribution  of social assistance decreases  as we use a broader
concept  of  social  assistance  and  move  from  per  capita  to  per  non-working  person
approach. As can be seen in Table  4.12, the Gini coefficient  for broad  social assistance
per non-working person is 48.3, but for narrow social assistance per capita it is almost 57.
The same regularity is observable for the coefficien:i of variation.
Ideally,  if  we  had  HBS-derived  data  on  poverty  headcounts  by  553  cities  and
pagasts  we could compare  spending  per  poor person  across all  553 local  governments.
But,  as explained  above, the most detailed picture  of poverty  that we can obtain  from
HBS is at the level of 15 HBS regions. We thus have to resort to a palliative solution. We
compute the per  capita  spending  of  (broadly defined)  social  assistance  across all  local
governments, and define as underprovisioned  the local governments that spend less than
50 percent of the country-wide per  capita average.  Ideally,  such underprovisioned  areas
should correspQnd to the underprovisioned  areas obtained  from the HBS,  and discussed
in para 4.42-4.45. Table 4.13 shows the correspondence  between the two classifications.
The calculations  based  on the Ministry  of Welfare data show that  only  131 rather  than
408 local governiments can be considered  underprovisioned.  About  80 percent  of these
131 local governments  (104 to be exact), however,  are also underprovisioned  according
to the HBS  data. It seems that the use of the Ministry data gives us the "hard  core" of the
28underprovisioned  areas. In terms of the population  living in the underprovisioned  areas,
the calculations based on the Ministry of Welfare data give some 337,000 people or about
28  percent  of total  population  living  in  towns  and rural  areas.  This  is  much  less than
876,000 people based  on the HBS  results.  However,  again,  more  80 percent  of people
defined  as  underprovisioned  according  to  the  Ministry  of  Welfare  are  also
underprovisioned according to the HBS data.
Table 4.13: Comparison of underprovisioned  areas according to
the HBS data and Ministry of Welfare
INumber of LG's  According to HBs
i__________________  IUnderprovisioned  Satisfactory  Total
Acc. to  Underprov.  104  27  131
Ministry  Satisfact.  304  118  422
of Welfare
Total  408  145  553
Population  According to HBs
Underprovisioned  Satisfactory  Total
Acc. to  Underprov  281062  56099  337161
Ministry  Satisfact.  594983  289816  884799
of  Welfare
lTotal  876045  f  345915  1221960
Note: "Underprovisioned"  areas  according  to HBS are defined  as all areas  where social assistance  disbursed  per estimated
poor person  is less  than 50% of country-wide  average.  "Underprovisioned"  areas  according  to the Ministry  of Welfzre  are
defined  as all areas  where  "broad"  social  assistance  per capita  is less  than 50% of country-wide  average.
We conclude  that the use of a relatively  rough indicator  of regional  allocation  of
social  assistance-broad  concept  of  social  assistance  divided  by  the  number  of
inhabitants-shows  that (1) there is a great diversity between the local governments  vvith
the Gini coefficient only slightly below 50, (2) about one-fourth of LG's  (131 out of 553)
comprising  27  percent  of  the  population  living  in  towns  and  rural  areas  are
underprovisioned,  and  (3)  thus  identified  underprovisioned  areas  represent  the  lower
bound, or the "hard core" of underprovisioned  areas. The implication is that the use o f the
more readily available Ministry data will allow us to avoid Type II error (we are unlikely
to misclassify a rich area as underprovisioned),  but will not protect us from the Type l of
error-a  fair number of underprovisioned  areas may be missed  out.
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